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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brian P. Bailey appeals from the district court's intermediate appellate
decision affirming his conviction for misdemeanor driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI).

Bailey challenges the denial of his request for "funding for an

expert on the weaknesses of the Lifeloc FC20," and the denial of his motion to
exclude the results of his breath test because (1) the standard operating
procedures for those tests were not "promulgated pursuant to IDAPA," and (2)
his consent to the breath test was allegedly involuntary because the arresting
officer read the advisory form to him without "first obtaining a warrant."

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Corporal Sean Lind responded to an accident in which Bailey rear-ended
a car, "push[ing it] into a third car." (R., p.10.) Upon making contact with Bailey,
Corporal Lind "could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage" and noticed
Bailey's "eyes were red and glassy" and Bailey "had two very large wads of gum
in his mouth." (R., p.10.) Bailey admitted having "one drink prior to the crash,"
but he failed two of the three field sobriety tests and the breathalyzer results
showed a blood alcohol content of .233/.256/.235. (R., pp.10, 14.)
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excessive blood alcohol content. (R., p.8.) Bailey filed a motion to suppress the
breath test results, arguing his consent to the test was invalid. (R., pp.21-30, 3233.)

Bailey also filed a motion in limine to exclude his breath test results,

contending the failure of the Idaho State Police (ISP) to comply with the

1

rulemaking requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA)
adopting Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and other methods for breath
testing "makes all such testing too unreliable for use at a criminal trial under LC.
§18-8004."

(R., pp.34-48, 60-62.)

Finally, Bailey filed a motion for the

appointment of an ex parte judge to conduct an ex parte hearing on a request for
public funds to hire an expert to assist in the preparation of his defense. (R.,
pp.49-52.) The magistrate denied all of Bailey's motions. (R., pp.63, 81-82.)
Bailey entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right on appeal to
challenge the denial of his motion to suppress, his motion in limine, and his
motion for funds for expert assistance.

(See Tr. 1 , p.89, Ls.1-10; see also R.,

pp.80, 87. 2) The magistrate entered judgment, but suspended Bailey's sentence
pending appeal, and Bailey filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court.
(R., pp.88-93.)

The district court affirmed and Bailey timely appealed to this

Court. (R., pp.171-187; Notice of Appeal, filed October 3, 2014.)
After Bailey filed his opening brief on appeal, the state filed a motion to
suspend because two of the three issues Bailey has raised on appeal were also
presented in State v. Haynes, Docket No. 41924, and State v. Riendeau, Docket

1

There are two transcripts included in the record on appeal - one that includes
several different hearings, which will be cited as "Tr.," and one that is for the
"sealed" hearing on Bailey's motion for expert assistance, which will be cited as
"12/18/13 Tr."
2

Although the register of actions reflects that Bailey filed a written conditional
guilty plea (R., p.5), as required by I.C.R. 11 (a)(2), that document is not included
in the record on appeal.

2

No. 41972.

(Uncontested Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and

Statement in Support Thereof, filed March 2, 2015.)

The Court granted the

state's motion and suspended the appeal until September 14, 2015, at which
time the appeal was reinstated.

(Order Granting Motion to Suspend the

Appellate Proceedings, dated March 23, 2015; September 14, 2015 notice
setting due date for Respondent's brief.)

3

ISSUES
Due to its length, Bailey's statement of the issues is not reproduced here,
but can be found at page 6 of the Appellant's Brief. The state rephrases the
issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Bailey failed to show error in the district court's determination that the
magistrate did not violate Bailey's constitutional rights by denying Bailey's
request for funds for an expert to challenge the "fallib[ility]" of the breathalyzer
"machine"?
2.
Did the lower courts, and does this Court, lack jurisdiction to consider
Bailey's complaints about the validity of ISP's Standard Operating Procedures?
Even if this Court declines to find a lack of jurisdiction over Bailey's challenge to
the SOPs in light of the Supreme Court's holding in State v. Haynes, 159 Idaho
36, _ , 355 P.3d 1266, 1275 (2015), that the SOPs are void for failing to
comply with the IAPA, should this Court limit Haynes and hold that, in the future,
a criminal defendant may not challenge the SOPs in his criminal case but must
instead seek relief under the procedures available under the IAPA?
3.
Has Bailey failed to show error in the district court's determination that the
magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts in denying Bailey's motion to
exclude the breath test results as unreliable and involuntary?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Bailey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That
The Magistrate Did Not Violate Bailey's Constitutional Rights By Denying His
Request For Expert Assistance

A

Introduction
Bailey moved the magistrate for an order requesting an ex parte judge

and an ex parte hearing for the purpose of considering a request for funds to hire
an expert for purpose of challenging the reliability of the breath testing machine.
(R., pp.49-52.) The magistrate allowed Bailey to present his request ex parte,
although not to a different judge, 3 and denied Bailey's motion for an expert. (See
generally Tr. 12/18/13.) The district court affirmed, finding the magistrate did not
abuse its discretion in declining Bailey's request because Bailey failed to make
the "threshold showing" required to grant his request for funds for an expert. (R.,
pp.173-177.)
Bailey raises two claims of error in relation to the district court's decision.
First, Bailey contends that the district court erred in applying an abuse of
discretion standard. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.) Second, Bailey argues that the
district court erred because "fundamental fairness" requires funds for a defense
expert whenever the "state chooses to pursue a case in which some scientific or
mechanicai method is [used] to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."

3

Prior to the ex parte hearing, the magistrate advised Bailey that his practice
was to consider the request for assistance ex parte and then decide whether the
information provided during the ex parte hearing required him to excuse himself
from subsequent proceedings. (Tr., p.12, L.11 - p.14, L.14, p.63, Ls.8-14.)
Bailey consented to that course of action. (Tr., p.14, L.16 - p.15, L.1.)

5

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

Both of these arguments lack merit.

The Idaho

Supreme Court has clearly adopted an abuse of discretion standard in relation to
defense requests for funds for an expert and, under the applicable legal
standards, the district court correctly agreed with the magistrate's determination
that Bailey failed to meet his burden of showing he was entitled to additional
funds for an expert to show the "machine" used to measure his breath alcohol
content was "fallible." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." ~
'"[DJenial of a request for expert or investigative assistance will not be
disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering
a decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of
the case."'

State v. Abduliah, 158 idaho 386,

, 348 P.3d 1, 34 (2015)

(quoting State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395, 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982)) (brackets
original).

6

C.

Bailey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Decision Affirming
The Magistrate's Conclusion That Bailey Failed To Show He Was Entitled
To Expend Public Funds On An Expert To Attack The Lifeloc 20 Breath
Testing Machine
Although the due process right to a fair trial entitles a criminal defendant

"access to the basic tools of an adequate defense," "the constitution does not
require a state to provide expert or investigative assistance merely because a
defendant requests it." Abdullah, 158 Idaho at

348 P.3d at 34 (citing Ake v.

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985); Olin, 103 Idaho at 394, 648 P.2d at 206)). In
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 381-382, 313 P.3d 1, 37-38 (2013) (citations
omitted), the Idaho Supreme Court outlined the considerations relevant to a
request for expert assistance, stating the request "should be reviewed in light of
all circumstances and be measured against the standard of 'fundamental
fairness' embodied in the due process clause." The authorization of public funds
requires the trial court to "determine whether the funds are necessary in the
interest of justice." ~ "There is little or no substantive difference between" the
standards articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Dunlap and Olin, and the
standards the Supreme Court articulated in Ake wherein the Court identified the
following three factors to consider: (1) "the private interest that will be affected
by the action of the State"; (2) "the governmental interest that will be affected if
the safeguard is to be provided"; and (3) "the probabie vaiue of the additionai or
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided."
Abdullah, 158 Idaho at_, 348 P.3d at 35 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77).
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Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 also guides a trial court's decision on whether to
grant a motion for public funds to pay for expert assistance. Rule 1

requires

that such a motion include:
(1)

The scope and details of the seNices requested.

(2)
The reasons the requested seNices are relevant and
necessary to the defense based on the specific facts of the case.
(3)
The name and location of the proposed providers of the
seNice.
(4)

The qualifications of the proposed providers of the seNices.

(5)
An estimate of the total cost of the seNices being requested,
including the hourly rate or other charges of the providers of the
seNices, and any additional expenses, such as travel costs, that
will be incurred.
(6)
If the proposed providers of the seNices are located outside
of the judicial district or the state of Idaho, an explanation of why
the proposed providers should be utilized and what efforts have
been made to locate providers of the requested seNices in the
judicial district or in the state of Idaho.
I.C.R. 12.2(b). 4
Bailey's first challenge to the district court's decision relating to his request
for expert assistance is that the district court erroneously applied an abuse of
discretion standard.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.)

4

In support of this argument,

Rule 12.2 became effective August 1, 2014, after Bailey filed his motion for
expert assistance in this case. However, the rule was intended to provide
guidelines for implementing the requirements of Ake and Olin and, as such, it
can be read consistently with the constitutional standards set forth in those
cases. See Michael Henderson, Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2: Guidance for
Obtaining Necessary Defense Resources, The Advocate, Vol. 57, No. 11/12,
p.34 (2014). This is presumably why the new rule was relied upon in State v.
Haynes, 159 Idaho 36, _ , 355 P.3d 1266, 1270-1271 (2015), even though its
effective date also post-dated Haynes' motion for expert assistance.
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Bailey contends that "Idaho's Supreme Court has yet to acknowledge the

ng"

in Ake, "despite deciding State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003), in its wake."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) This argument is contrary to law.
In its opinion in Dunlap, which was issued on August 27, 2013, nine
months before Bailey filed his district court appellate brief (R., pp.97-125), and
more than one year before Bailey filed his opening brief on appeal in this case,
the Idaho Supreme Court expressly discussed Ake and stated that consideration
of a defense request for expert assistance "necessarily involves the exercise of
the sound discretion of the trial court, and a denial of a request for investigative
assistance will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its
discretion by rendering a decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by
the circumstances of the case." Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 381-382, 313 P.3d at 3738. Bailey's assertion that the Idaho Supreme Court has not acknowledged Ake
or articulated a relevant standard of review is meritless.
Bailey's related argument that an abuse of discretion is improper also
lacks merit. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) Bailey contends "the abuse of discretion
standard does not make sense within the Ake framework" because, he argues:
To say that each trial judge needs to determine at their discretion
whether, as here, the breath testing machine is a significant factor
in a DUI case involving a breath test, or whether an expert who can
gather facts about the machine and expose its weaknesses, is
absurd. The question, as will be discussed below, is simply
whether those two arguments ring true. They do.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) This argument fails for at least one of two reasons.
First, to the extent Bailey's argument is that the facts of his case require
the appointment of a defense expert, this argument is not inconsistent with an

9

abuse of discretion standard.

The abuse of discretion standard requires a

reviewing court to consider whether the trial court ( 1) correctly perceived the
issue to be one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165,166,296 P.3d 371,372 (2013) (citing State v.
Cobler, 148 Idaho 769,771,229 P.3d 374,376 (2010)). If the trial court did not
render its decision consistently with the applicable legal standards by failing to
authorize expert assistance when the facts warranted it, such would be an abuse
of discretion. That Bailey believes the trial court was incorrect does not mean an
abuse of discretion standard does not or cannot apply.
Second, to the extent Bailey is arguing that an abuse of discretion
standard is improper because he believes a trial court must always appoint an
expert, without any inquiry into constitutional requirements or the parameters of
I.C.R. 12.2, whenever the state "pursue[s] a case in which some scientific or
mechanical method" is used (Appellant's Brief, p.9, 12), his argument fails
because it is contrary to all relevant law, including Ake, which itself articulated a
three-part test for courts to apply.
The magistrate's decision on whether to grant Bailey's request for funds
for expert assistance was properly reviewed by the district court under an abuse
of discretion standard and is subject to the same standard of review in this Court.
Bailey's claim to the contrary fails.

10

Bailey's second challenge in relation to the denial of his request for expert
assistance is that "fundamental fairness" required the magistrate to grant his
motion so he could challenge the "machine and [the] man claiming expert status
to prove that [his] BAC was .2 or above." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The record
and the law support the magistrate's and district court's contrary conclusion
because Bailey failed to meet his burden of satisfying the threshold standard for
the appointment of an expert.
Bailey's written motion regarding expert assistance fell far short of
complying with the requirements of I.C.R. 12.2. In fact, the only motion Bailey
filed in relation to his request for an expert did not identify the type of expert
sought, much less explain why due process required the appointment of an
expert in this case.

(R., pp.49-52.)

At the hearing on his motion, Bailey

explained he was seeking "money to afford an expert on the issue of how the
Lifeloc FC20 works" and indicated he "kn[e]w of two people who have claimed to
be experts," was "told that they can do the Lifeloc" but was "also" "told that no
one knows anything about the Lifeloc FC20," so he was a "little unsure about
that." (12/18/13 Tr., p.2, Ls.15-22.) Bailey stated his "thinking" was that these
"two people ... would come in to this case to show that the uh, blow in this
particular case was not uh, as high as it appears." (12/18/13 Tr., p.2, L.23 - p.3,
L.1.)

According to Bailey, if the court did not authorize funds for a defense

expert, "the only thing that [he could] do is subpoena the state's expert, Mr.
Johnston," and Bailey had "no faith in [Mr. Johnston's] ability to be honest"
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because "he's held his position" for "a decade" and his "bias for the prosecution
is

pretty much open and obvious." (12/18/13 Tr., p.

Ls.17-22.)

When asked about the cost of the requested expert assistance, Bailey
answered:
Dr. Klestala (phonetic), who was in WashinQton, your Honor.
When I contacted him, he said that he would testify for our office.
And I was only asking him about a particular part of his research,
so this could differ. But he was offering his services at about
$2,500 for his testimony. And that, he said, would include travel
expenses and the whole nine yards ....
And I'm -- the only other expert that I'm aware of is Dr.
Stalvis (phonetic), he's out of Ohio. And my guess is that his price
will be substantially more.
(12/18/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-20.)
The magistrate denied Bailey's request, stating:
So, my finding at this point would be that the threshold
showing is inadequate to show that this would be the type of
information that would, in fact, be a significant factor at trial, such
that the accuracy of the jury's determination would be called into
question if the assistance was denied. That is, I see a deficiency in
that threshold showing, based on the information that I have before
the Court and the status of this type of testing.
(12/18/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-9.)
The district court correctly affirmed the magistrate's decision given
Bailey's failure to make any showing that either of the experts he mentioned
were actually capable of challenging the breath test machine used in this case.
Indeed, Bailey admitted that, although he had been "told" his proposed experts
could "do the Lifeloc," he was also "told that no one knows anything about the
Lifeloc FC20."

(12/18/13 Tr., p.2, Ls.19-22.)

Fundamental fairness did not

require the expenditure of public funds for an expert, much less two experts, to

12

testify about a machine the "experts" apparently know nothing about. Nor did
Bailey present any evidence that the Lifeloc20 was defective or "fallible.
Bailey's assertions that he was entitled to an expert, or two, to show the
"machine and the expert are untrustworthy" (Appellant's Brief, p.11) is based on
accusations that are unsupported by any actual evidence.
Because Bailey failed to meet his burden of showing the appointment of a
defense expert was necessary in this case, he has failed to show any error in the
district court's decision affirming the magistrate's denial of his request for expert
assistance. Compare Abdullah, 158 Idaho at_, 348 P.3d at 34-35 (affirming
denial of request for forensic science or DNA expert to challenge testimony of
state's DNA expert).

11.
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Consider The Validity Of The SOPs About
Which Bailey Complains
A.

Introduction
One of Bailey's arguments regarding the admissibility of his breath test

results is that the results should be excluded because the applicable SOPs
adopted by ISP did not comply with IAPA and therefore, he contends, the
SOPs are "void" and "no method exists" to show the results of the test are
reliable. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-24.) Although the magistrate and district court
rejected this argument, neither the lower court nor this Court have jurisdiction to
address the validity of the S0Ps in this criminal case. Even if this Court rejects
the state's jurisdictional argument in light of the Court's recent opinion in Haynes,
159 Idaho at_, 355 P.3d at 1275, in which the Court declared the SOPs void,
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this Court should limit Haynes and hold that future challenges to the SOPs may
only be raised under the procedures set forth in the IAPA.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, given

free review. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003).

C.

The District Court And The Appellate Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction In
This Criminal Case To Consider Bailey's Challenge To The Validity Of
The 2013 SOPs
Bailey argues that ISP did not approve methods for breath testing in

compliance with the IAPA and, as a result, the methods approved by ISP are
without effect. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-24.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently
held as much in Haynes, supra, and State v. Riendeau, 159 Idaho 52, _ , 355
P.3d 1282, 1285 (2015).

However, neither Haynes nor Riendeau addressed

whether a defendant in a criminal case has standing to bring a challenge to the
manner in which ISP approved BAC testing methods as a basis for excluding the
breath test result in the criminal case. 5 Because, for the reasons set forth below,
the judicial review provisions of the IAPA provide the exclusive means by which
to challenge the validity of ISP's action, neither this Court nor the lower court
have jurisdiction to entertain Bailey's challenge.
"Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless
expressly authorized by statute." Laughy v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 149 Idaho

5

The state raised this jurisdictional issue in both Haynes and Riendeau, but the
Court did not address it in either opinion. The state is therefore again seeking a
ruling on the question in this case.
14

867, 870, 243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010) (citing LR.
State, 153 Idaho 246, 250, 280 P.3d 749, 753

1

P. 84(a)(1 )); Johnson v.
(same). Idaho Code§

5270 permits judicial review of final agency actions, including the failure of an
agency to "issue a rule" or "to perform, any duty placed on it by law." See 1.C. §
67-5201 (3) (definition of "Agency action"); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 871, 243 P.3d at
1059 (summarizing "types of agency actions that could be reviewed by a court").
However, in order to be entitled to such review, the "person aggrieved by final
agency action" must comply with the procedural requirements of LC. §§ 67-5271
through 67-5279. I.C. § 67-5270(2); BV Beverage Co., LLC v. State, 155 Idaho
624, 627, 315 P.3d 812, 815 (2013); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at
1058. Where, as here, the aggrieved person is challenging the validity of a rule,
compliance with the procedural requirements necessary to obtain judicial review
requires the person to, among other things: exhaust all available administrative
remedies (I.C. § 67-5271), institute proceedings for review or declaratory
judgment by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which the final
agency action was taken or where the aggrieved person resides (I.C. § 675272(1 )), file the petition within two years of the adoption of the rule being
challenged (I.C. §§ 67-5231 and 67-5273), and make the agency a party to the
action (I.C. § 67-5278).

Bailey did not comply with any of these procedural

requirements, nor could he ever have done so in the criminal case.
From the beginning of this case, Bailey has sought a judicial ruiing
invalidating the S0Ps for BAC testing based on ISP's failure to have complied
with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the testing
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methods contained in the SOPs.

But Bailey did not comply with the judicial

review provisions of the IAPA. To the state's knowledge, he did not attempt to
pursue any available administrative remedies.

I.C. § 67-5271.

Nor did he

"institute" any "proceedings for review or declaratory judgment" by filing a timely
petition in the district court of the appropriate county and naming ISP as a party
to the action. I.C. §§ 67-5272, 67-5273, 67-5278. Instead, Bailey has attempted
to have the SOPs invalidated as a basis for excluding his breath test result in the
criminal case. Nothing in the IAPA or in any other statute, including I.C. § 188004, enables Bailey to challenge the validity of ISP's action in this forum and in
this manner. Bailey's attempt to do so is, in his own words, nothing more than
an attempt to make "an end-run around the requirements" of the IAPA.
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)
Because there is no statute that authorizes Bailey to raise ISP's alleged
noncompliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA as a defense in the
criminal case, Bailey lacked standing to bring the challenge and both the lower
court and this Court are without jurisdiction to consider it.

See Laughy, 149

Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 1058 ("Without an enabling statute, the district court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction" to review agency action.).

Because the IAPA

applies to ISP's actions in approving methods for breath testing, see Haynes,
159 Idaho _, 355 P.3d at 1273-1275, it also applies to bar Bailey's attempt to
challenge those actions in this criminal case, and this Court may affirm the
district court's decision on this basis.

See Total Success Investments, LLC v.

Ada County Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App.
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2010) ("an appellate court may affirm the district court's decision if an alternative
legal basis supports it"); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v.
Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993) ("where an order of the
district court is correct but based upon an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm
upon the correct theory").
The state acknowledges that, in Haynes, the Court addressed the merits
of Haynes' challenge to the SOPs despite Haynes' failure to pursue relief under
the IAPA, and declared the SOPs "void." Haynes, 159 Idaho at

355 P.3d at

1275. Even if this Court declines to address the jurisdictional argument again in
this case in light of its prior determination that the SOPs are void, the Court
should take this opportunity to limit Haynes and hold that future challenges to
SOPs must be brought pursuant to IAPA because that is what IAPA requires.
See State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002) (controlling
precedent must be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven
over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice").

111.
Bailey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That The
Magistrate Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying Bailey's Motions
To Exclude The Breath Test Results
A.

Introduction
Bailey challenges the denial of his motions to exclude the results of his

breath test, arguing as he did to the magistrate and district courts below that the
accuracy of those results is inherently unreliable and that the results were
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obtained without his voluntary consent. All of Bailey's arguments fail because he
failed

demonstrate the results of his breath test are unreliable or that his

consent to the breath test was constitutionally infirm.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district

court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., supra, and
is incorporated herein by reference.
"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is
challenged, [the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact
supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho
134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. Questions of law, including
whether the state has satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission
of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, are subject to free review. State v.
Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 452, 988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v.
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 339, 882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct. App. 1994).
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. VVhen a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutionai principies to those facts.
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).
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The Record Does Not Support Bailey's Claim That His Breath Test
Results Are Unreliable
Bailey filed two motions in !imine requesting exclusion of the results of his

breath test.

In his first motion in limine, Bailey argued the test results were

inadmissible due to changes in the SOPs that involved replacing the word "must"
with "should" in relation to the verification and observation standards, which
changes were made without complying with IAPA. (R., pp.34-47.) According to
Bailey, these changes, and the manner in which they were made, rendered the
"testing too unreliable for use at a criminal trial." (R., p.47.)
In his second motion in limine, Bailey argued:
In the present case, a review of the 6.0 Standard Operating
Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing published by the Idaho State
Patrol shows that the defendant's breath samples should have had
a .02 agreement. SOP 6.2. In this case, the defendant's first two
breath samples were .233 and .256. A third sample was taken two
minutes later and received a .235. A compliance check done
thereafter for the .2 solution showed results of .188/.184. The
SOPs do not indicate whether or how the results are valid if the
third sample is within the .02 of a previous test, or which test it
should be within .02 of. Further, the SOPs require a 15 minute
observation period before the third sample if mouth alcohol is
suspected. Therefore, the results of the defendant's SAC are
properly excludable.
(R., p.61.) The magistrate and district court correctly rejected both of Bailey's in

limine arguments as grounds for exclusion.

(Tr., p.78, L.8 - p.79, L.17; R.,

pp.177-183.)
At the hearing on Bailey's motions in limine, Corporal Lind testified about
the standard operating procedure he followed in testing Bailey, including the
reasons he obtained a third sample given that the first two samples were not
within .02 of each other.

(Tr., p.22, L.17 - p.27, L.2.)
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Corporal Lind also

explained why a 15-minute observation period was not required prior to taking
the third sample (Tr., p.27, Ls.3-15), and he testified that he performed a
compliance check on his Lifeloc within two hours of testing Bailey and "detected
no malfunctions with it" (Tr., p.27, L.22 - p.28, L.10).
Jeremy Johnston also testified at the hearing on Bailey's motions. (Tr.,
pp.30-54.) Mr. Johnston works for ISP and is "basically in charge of the blood
and breath alcohol program for the State." (Tr., p.31, Ls.12-21.) Mr. Johnston
explained the reason for the third test, why no 15-minute observ'ation period was
required prior to the third test, and why the test results were valid and reliable.
(Tr., p.38, L.23 - p.54, L.4.) Mr. Johnston also testified Corporal Lind "followed
the Standard Operating Procedure." (Tr., p.42, Ls.18-19.)
Neither Bailey's concerns about the adoption of the SOPs or the
differences in his breath test results, which required a third sample, support his
argument that the test results are inadmissible. As the Idaho Supreme Court
explained in Riendeau, 159 Idaho at_, 355 P.3d at 1285, a finding that the
SOPs are void does not mean the test results conducted under those standards
are inadmissible because the evidence may still be admitted if the "breath test
was administered in conformity with applicable test procedures." The evidence
presented supports the magistrate's conclusion that the results were admissible.
In fact, the evidence in this case is strikingly similar to the evidence presented in
Riendeau, which led the Court to conclude "that the test results were
admissible."

kl

Bailey has failed to present any cogent factual or legal

argument that his tests results were unreliable and inadmissible.
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D.

The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate's Determination That
Bailey's Consent To The Breath Test Was Valid
Bailey moved to suppress his breath test results, arguing that his consent

to the BAC testing was not voluntary because it was obtained after Corporal Lind
advised him of the penalties that would attach if he refused the test. (R., pp.2130.) The magistrate denied the motion, and the district court affirmed. (R, p.63,
82, 183-187; Tr., p.9, L.8 - p.10, L.7.)
Bailey challenges the lower courts' rulings, arguing that "a law providing
for various penalties for relying on one's constitutional rights is invalid, as is any
consent provided after being warned of those penalties."
p.28.)

(Appellant's Brief,

The Idaho Supreme Court recently rejected this same argument in

Haynes, 159 Idaho at _ , 355 P.3d at 1275-1276.

The Court noted that

because the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and its
counterpart in Idaho's constitution, only prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, "the issue is whether a request by a peace officer that a person submit
to a breath test constitutes an unreasonable search where the officer had
reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating or in actual control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol". Haynes, 159 Idaho at
_ , 355 P.3d at 1275. The Court held such a search is not unreasonable.

kl

In this case, Corporal Lind had reasonable grounds to believe Bailey was
driving

under the

influence given

his

observations

of Bailey,

Bailey's

performance on the field sobriety tests, and Bailey's admission to drinking prior
to the accident. (R., p.10.) Indeed, at the suppression hearing, defense counsel
conceded the "officer reasonably believed that [Bailey] may be under the
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influence." (Tr., p.6, Ls. 12-14.) Corporal Lind's request that Bailey submit to a
breath test was therefore reasonable and did not violate either the Fourth
Amendment or the Idaho Constitution. Haynes, supra. Bailey's claim that his
consent to the breath test requested by Corporal Lind was involuntary fails.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
intermediate appellate decision affirming Bailey's conviction for misdemeanor
driving under the influence with an excessive blood alcohol content.
DATED this 11th day of December, 2015.

Attorney General
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